https://www.nytimes.com/1976/05/06/archives/rhodesian-chrome-a-dull-black-ore-that-sets-sparks-flying-in.html

The most important part of this article from 1976 is from the last paragraph:

"This has spurred Senator Byrd and his allies to assert that the United States must not become dependent on a Communist country for a raw material essential to national security."

(so with China being the largest ferrochrome producer in the world(with No chromium reserves...and South Africa being the 2nd largest producer(with some big problems going on right now...)

Is the USA going to rely on ...........China????

another article from the past....

http://digitalcollections.library.cmu.edu/awweb/awarchive?type=file&item=400437

MAJOR CONSIDERATIONS CONCERNING RHODESIAN CHROME Essential Need for Chrome: A basic fact is that the United States desperately needs Rhodesian chrome especially ferrochrome, an alloy of chrome which is essential for specialty steel products (e.g., stainless steel).

Unlike the situation in World War II when synthetic rubber could be substituted for rubber in our vital industries, there is no substitute for% chromium in stainless steel (each ton of stainless steel must contain at least 11% chrome or 220 pounds. Normally, chrome content is about 18%). Except for the period of the boycott (1967-1971), Rhodesia has been a faithful supplier of this vital material to the United States.

No chromite ore has been mined in the U.S. since 1961 and Rhodesia possesses 67.3% of the known world resources of metallurgical grade chromite. U.S. Chrome Supply and Future Requirements: The assertion has been made that the U.S. has sufficient chrome in our national stockpile to meet our national defense needs citing the fact that the Department of Defense purchases of chrome-bearing metals account for three percent of our national stockpile.

This is not the complete story. In the consideration of our defense needs, we must look at the end-uses of most chrome based metals. Over 94% of stainless steel (which accounts for 91% of the chrome consumption) is used in industrial applications ranging from chemical production to food handling equipment.

Petroleum refining, power generation, and pollution control equipment are dependent upon the availability of large quantities of stainless steel. We are talking about the critical use of stainless steel in petroleum refining operations and building nuclear power plants to meet our current energy crisis and in pollution control devices (auto catalytic converters).

This specialty steel is also essential in the production of aerospace equipment, railroad cars, construction equipment, and jet engines. The present stockpile of chrome could probably supply our strictly defense needs but could not supply defense-supporting needs and could seriously damage our domestic stainless steel industry. In 1972 the United States used 309,000 tons of ferrochrome and about 400,000 tons in 1973. The demand for stainless steel will likely accelerate at a geometric rate in future years. Current forecasts estimate that the U.S. may be using 750,000 tons of ferrochrome by 19801 We need to make the proper preparations now in order to avoid a shortage of this precious metal in future years.

At present, there are no reserves of metallurgical grade chrome in the U.S. and the U.S. ferrochrome industry, for a variety of reasons, has been a declining industry. Since 1962 the national stockpile of this critical ore has declined by over 43% and it is now at the lowest level in fifteen years.

It is essential that we seek an adequate supply of chrome as inexpensive as possible from as many sources as possible in order to preserve the existence of our specialty steel industry and the thousands of American jobs associated with this industry. Chrome from Rhodesla or Russia: If we restored the ban on Rhodesian chrome, the United States would have to rely on the only other large source of chrome in the world outside Rhodesla and South Africa (which uses Rhodesian chrome to upgrade its own ore) Soviet Russia. Considering our past dealings with the Soviet Union, a reliance on the Soviets for such a precious metal would be precarious for our best national interests. We already have had some revealing experiences with the U.S.S.R. on the chrome issue during the period the U.S. supported the boycott. Soviet chrome more than doubled In price and the price of ferrochrome went up 60% to 70% during this time. The United States had been paying $39.50 a ton for the Rhodesian ore compared to $55.50 a ton for the Russian ore. The average price of Russian chrome jumped from $35.78 a tun in 1965 to $68.49 a ton in 1971 allowing the Russians to reap "windfall profits" on our need for the chrome. Russian prices reached their peak in 1971 despite the fact that chrome demand reached a ten year low! With the enactment of the Byrd amendment in 1971, the Russian price stabilized and declined with the highly competitive Rhodesian chrome again reaching the American markets. Continued importation of chrome from Rhodesia would guarantee the U.S. a reliable supplier sr.d prevent the U.S. from relying on a dubious source of supply (the Soviet Union), which did not hesitate to enforce its advantage 1a the trade earlier by raising prices. The International Issue and Boycott: An issue has been raised that the United 5tatos should adhere to the United Nations boycott and tiiat such action would increase our acceptance (and trade) among African nations. Eight yaars of the boycott has proved that other nations have given vocal support but in actuality it has been only Britain and the United States (until 1971) among the industralized nations which have enforced it. Italy, Japan, France, West Germany and even Communist China have continued to trade with Rhodesia. Even Secretary Henry Kissinger acknowledged in testimony before the Senate Finance Committee that Rhodesia was not a threat to world peace, (the prerequisite for the U.N. embargo against Rhodesia) and declared that he "would have to review the particular positions on the embargo." (March 7, 1974). While millions of Americans were inconvenienced by reduced supplies of petroleum products during the Arab boycott, the U.S. refused to capitulate to international blackmail in changing its foreign policy toward Israel. The U.S. should maintain good relations with all nations but not at the expense of sacrificing an independent foreign policy. If we would resto*x the boycott in deference to a number of vocal African nations, we would be giving into political blackmail while sacrificing a matter of our own national security. The U.S. has made only a narrow exception to the trade boycott of Rhodesia (chrome-ferrochrome-nickel-asbestos) while other members of the U.N. freely trade a variety of items with Rhodesia. The entire question in international affairs boils dow; to one essential question: Will the United States import chrome directly from Rhodesia or will it obtain Rhodesian chrome via importing a finished product (stainless steel from Japan) which would cripple our own specialty steel industry and cause unemployment? Dependence on a strong competitor for a finished product (Japan) or on an unreliable source for the chrome (U.S.S.R.) is a risky economic and political decision in a turbulent world in order to uphold an embargo which only one major industrial nation supports!