This is a paper I wrote in 2006 on Sino-Japanese Energy Policy. It is a goo primer on what Japan has gone through with nuclear energy and what the direction was a few years back. Interesting to read it over in the light of what has recently transpired.

Keep in mind, this was not a masters thesis, so it is not terribly in depth, but it has good information in it and some good sources for anyone to look up if they were so inclined to continue their research.

Enjoy, J.

Download here: http://www.megaupload.com/?d=A12TXSWC

Written November 15, 2006

Introduction

It has been a major issue for policy makers for generations. It has been the reason for which states have gone to war. It has been the reason states have won or lost wars. It is arguably the most important commodity in our industrialized world and even more so in rapidly industrializing states. Energy has been one of the hottest topics in the news for quite some time, and it will continue to be so for quite some time to come. Energy is a very large theme to delve into, but in the case of the most powerful Asian nations, it is necessary to understand its function if one is to address their security in the region and their interaction.

China and Japan are contrasting states in a plethora of socio-economic degrees: from the income per capita to culture and language. Alas, with respect to energy, the two Asian powers have much more in common than one would initially think. They are both reliant on similar sources for similar resources which are scarce; concurrent contracts on identical resources; and they have deep economic ties in each others energy industries.

In the following pages, we will take an in depth look at what is occurring in their respective energy markets, what types of resources have historically been used, what future trends will be, and we will look into how domestic policies are dealing with the current situation of resource scarcity and international pressure on a bid to develop energy security. Lastly, as it is a well documented fact that competition for a scarce resource yields can lead to violent conflict, we will look at past occurrences in the region and determine whether the likelihood of future violence is high.
Japan

The archipelago of Japan long been dependant on foreign sources of energy given the lack of natural resources which it posses. One need only look at how big the issue of oil was during the Second World War for the Japanese. In 1941 Tokyo was highly dependant on American and Dutch East Indie sources for the fuel vital to its navy’s operation.[1] Energy was vital at a time of war when the operational efforts are dependant thereon. In times of peace in a highly industrialized state, energy is a concern for the production of electricity, heat and for industrial purposes. The problems which existed sixty years ago in Japan persists today – energy dependence.

Domestic demand issues and energy policy

Energy consumption in Japan is heavily weighted towards final usage in the form of electricity. In fact 47 percent of energy is for electrical consumption, whereas transportation, although in a steady growth phase, accounts for about 26% of the demands on the system.[2] Industrial demands are account for the balance, but are not in significant growth trends given the evolution of the Japan economy towards a service base. In real terms this means that daily energy expenditures in Japan focus on heavily on hydrocarbons as a source. In 1996, when the last numbers were published by the International Energy Agency, oil was the source for 55.2 percent of the energy, flowed by coal and natural gas with 16.4 percent and 11.4 percent respectively.[3]

Alas, are there any domestic sources of energy which can sustain a considerable portion of the grids load? Hydropower has a meager share of the market at 3.4% annually. Nuclear power however does propose a somewhat more interesting position with 12.3% of the energy consumption.[4]

In line with the shared goals of the International Energy Agency, Japan has adopted to align its energy policy with the “3 Es”. The tenants of this policy are to attain energy security, economic growth and environmental protection simultaneously.[5] In 1994 the Advisory Committee for Energy, an advisory body to the Minister of International Trade and Industry, drew up a long-term energy supply-demand outlook which took these three factors into consideration and established a concrete plan for reaching their stated goal mainly by curbing growth to one percent by focusing on conservation and reducing the dependency on foreign crude sources.[6]

The case for oil

The case for oil as the key to energy security is hardly a hard one to make in this member state of the cosmopolitan world which is dependant on hydrocarbons. At the time of publication, the International Energy Agency stated that there were 37 Japanese firms which developed oil interest abroad for domestic consumption, which represents less than fifteen percent of total consumption and infers that other sources are much less secure as they are governed by market movement and foreign laws.[7]

As such the main source for oil in Japan is Middle Eastern nations which control significant portions of the world’s reserves and are highly influential in the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries. Therefore, such global occurrence as OPEC production cuts to stabilize high prices,[8] and local tensions and acts of terrorism[9] which reach havoc on the price of crude futures is of great concern given that the heavy fuel costs for power generation are consistently above the average in other OECD nations.[10] However, market driven factors, such as shortages of exploration and reserve recovery which have seen the price of oil spike in recent months are out of the realm of the government to control.[11] Moreover, as we will see later, the breach of Production Sharing Agreements with other nations have further compromised the supply of hydrocarbons, and bolster the fact that Japan need to seek further security for the future of their upstream supply.

In attempts to stabilize their own internal prices, the Japanese government has taken steps to ensure that the midstream supply line remains stable so as to hedge the upstream uncertainties. Firstly, since 1990, the Petroleum Council has gradually raised refining capacity to meet increased demand.[12] Secondly, the Japanese government maintains very high levels of strategic reserves under the Japan National Oil Corporation (JNOC).[13] Moreover to protect the individuals, Tokyo has taken the necessary steps to liberalize the retail gasoline markets, impose smaller margins on pump prices and bring them in line with other developed countries over which consumers were paying a premium.[14] Lastly, recognizing its extreme dependence for oil not only form foreign sources, but also from foreign firms, there have been initiatives to reduce demand pressure by persuading individuals and businesses alike to conserve energy and balance out the equation by domestic means.[15]

The case for coal

Japan is the world’s premier coal importer with imports exceeding 60 million tons a year, which accounts for roughly 28 percent of global imports. 60 percent of the material is utilized for power generation.[16] As sources for coal are generally stable for the archipelago, the burning of this hydrocarbon is part of the base for the daily electrical output.[17]

As importing coal is becoming significantly less expensive than domestic production, Japan has closed its largest coal mine and currently only has two underground mines and eleven open-pits in operation. Domestic production represents less than seven percent of all coal consumption.[18] As stated sources for coal are generally very stable and are yielded, for the main part, from like minded liberal democracies such as the United States and Australia. However, it is worthy of note that China, the world’s second largest exporter of coal, has experienced a large spike in demand for coal contracts from their island neighbors in recent years.[19] Despite the Chinese contingency here, coal remains a very stable source of energy as it can readily be purchased on the spot-market, albeit at a premium, and have its delivery guaranteed by the exchange.[20]

Therefore, the government maintains that the security which coal presents on an upstream basis makes it an ideal candidate for securing part of the energy security desired by the state. Conversely, coal is by far not the cleanest burning fuel and would go against one of the “3Es”, environmental protection. Consequently, there has been significant policy research and questioning as how to approach coal as a staple in the energy equation. It was concluded that it would be necessary to develop or invest in Clean Coal technology from North America to met emission standards and render coal use acceptable in the mid to long term.[21]

Coal does account for a hefty amount of Japanese electrical supply, the 20 percent that is represents will not secure the consumption of a nation and thus not bring about energy security.

The case for natural gas

When looking at the daily load curve of electricity production in Japan, it is very interesting to note that natural gases are essential in the mid-supply range.[22] Under this heading we include natural gas, liquid natural gas (LNG) and liquefied petroleum gas (LPG), which combined represent almost fifteen percent of Japans current energy supply and hopes are to increase that with time.[23]

Natural gases are a desirable source of energy given that their sources are from regionally dominated sources versus the Middle Eastern dominated oil imports. Gas has been supplied mainly by Indonesia, complimented by Malaysian and Australian imports, supported by other American and Middle Eastern sources. [24] Moreover, gas “compared to other fossil fuels, it is less of a burden on the environment” and therefore is a sought after in promoting the “3Es” of national energy policy.[25]

Consequently the central government has envisioned a boost in natural gases to account for 20 percent of the energy supply in line with European and North American nations.[26] To reach this goal, the private sector with the help from the JNOC, have set out to guarantee debt financing and capital support in order to sustain growth in the industry’s exploration and expansion. Loans and tax benefits from the Japan Development Bank have been granted to the support of domestic infrastructure which currently lacks to the ability to prop up growth expectancies in the industry due to lack of logistics and receiving terminals.[27] Currently, the natural gas distribution grid only covers five percent of the Japans land area and 21 percent of the urban landscape. Terminal capacity is also lackluster in regards to supporting the envisioned growth. There are only 22 LNG terminals which can convert imports back into a gaseous form their liquefied transportation form.[28]

Future plans, which are high in capital expenditure, include the development of the above sore points but also the development of pipelines. Pipeline transportation implies that ventures must be undertaken in conjunction with foreign governments and thus are highly dependant thereon. One of the most promising projects will be discussed in the last section of this report.

The case for nuclear power

As previously noted, nuclear energy is one of the only sources of electrical output which is domestically produced by the archipelago. As such, atomic energy supports the base load supply of the daily electrical generation[29] but only represents 12.3 percent of the total energy consumption.[30] The case for nuclear energy, from the government’s perspective, is rather strong. Due to the compliance with the “3Es” of the domestic energy policy, nuclear sources are seen as a preferred avenue for the state to take in the future.

However, there is one large looming issue with the use of this source, public perception. “Opinion polls indicate that while 70 percent of the people acknowledge the need for nuclear power to one degree or another, some 40 percent have concerns over its safety.”[31]

Obviously the need to address the question of safety is at the forefront of the development of nuclear industry growth. Consequently, the Japanese Government commissioned the Convention on Nuclear Safety for which the preliminary findings were issued in August 2004. The report outlines in detail the duties and responsibilities of safety organizations such as the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA), the Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization (JNESO), the Nuclear Safety Commission (NSC) and the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC).[32] Their responsibilities are to plan and implement safety measures at all levels of the nuclear chain. For example, the NSC has suggested that more frequent inspections of plants would greatly increase quality and safety to prevent disasters[33] and NISA suggests much stricter licensing regulations, restrictions and penalties for violations.[34] The end result of these efforts are to promote safety culture and market nuclear energy to the people as being a safe and stable alternative to fossil fuels.[35]


China

The past few years, there is not one country that has had some an impact on global politics and economics the way China has. The staggering rate at which this emerging power has grown since the 1978 has put extreme pressure on the central governments ability to provide energy for the entire population. Moreover, this strain comes to a state which has huge resource potential given its landmass and is at the same time one of the worlds large exporters (coal) and future importers (oil) of hydrocarbons. Unlike Japan, China is not a fully industrialized state which has had gradual growth permitting it to adjust to the factors of continuous demand increases in the energy department. And therein lies the problem for China, extreme demand pressure is exercising pressure on domestic infrastructure to a point where efficiency is being sacrificed for the sheer output volume of the marketable product.

Stunning growth rates in China after the 1978 reforms have yielded a state that is consuming everything it can get its hands on.[36] Policy in the following years neglected to recognize the need for additional resources and has lead to a tight squeeze for the energy market as rapid industrialization, which characterizes the growth, created seemingly unquenchable energy needs.[37] Energy demand growth has been in the region of five percent annum, which internal sources cannot support. Moreover, industrialization processes in the behemoth are archaic and inefficient, industries need more energy per unit output and vehicles are consuming far more fuel than is necessary.[38]

The main issue for future Chinese development is securing enough resources to continue along the same growth curve currently present. Energy concerns have a high impact on foreign policy as securing resources becomes increasingly difficult as actors are vying for the same resources as it is. Alas, in order to maintain energy security, china will have to look to regional cooperation to ensure flows.[39]

The case for coal

The case for coal in China is quite simple, they are extremely dependant on it to produce electricity, and in 1998 coal accounted for two thirds of the national electrical output. China is a coal power in the world, they are the second only to Russia in regards to actual reserves. However, the deposits lie in remote regions in the north-central eastern provinces of Shaanxi, Shanxi and Henan. China represents six percent of world coal exports, but will exert domestic demand on that number in coming years.[40]

Coal-fired power plants account for 70 percent of the annual energy production, whereas oil represents the six percent and gas and nuclear share the remainder of the load.[41] The fact of the matter is that domestically produced coal is the cheapest way to produce energy in this emerging state which still has 200 million people living in poverty and only 80 percent of the population on the electrical grid.[42] With a majority of the growth to be from poor rural areas, which are logistically inefficient targets for any other source of energy, it is only natural for 0.5USD coal to be favored over 2.1USD domestic oil or worse yet 58USD a barrel on the open market.[43]

As China only consumes 25 percent as much energy per capita as OECD countries, there is growth to be realized over quite some time.[44] What this means for the international coal industry is that China will not be as strong an exporter as it once was. Mimicking the oil situation, which we will discuss below, the government, is aware of the upcoming supply/demand deficit, which experts say will lead to a 330 million ton shortage by 2010, but is not taking sufficient measures to curb its policy in accordance.[45] The repercussions on foreign purchasers of Chinese coal will soon begin to be felt. With Japan as the premier global coal importer which consumes eleven percent of all Chinese exports, times will get interesting.[46]

The case for oil and gas

With the liberalization of the economy in 1978 came the prospect of exporting goods for profit. The Daqing field in the northeast of the country, discovered in the 1950’s, offered a generation of Chinese secure oil reserves.[47] As a strong oil producer, exports flowed until 1993 when the balance was inversed and domestic supply could not support demand, the Chinese government had to go hunting for petrol in undesirable domestic territories, regional locations and in foreign zones.

Domestically, the Tarim basin proposed the most immediate answer given the reserve estimates which were said to rival Saudi’s. However, the basin is sectioned off into small and medium sized reservoirs, as opposed to one large pool, which are costly to exploit. Thus, in 1998 the China National Petroleum Corporation had commissioned an in depth study which concluded the non-viability of the project and the abandonment of domestic onshore potential for oil and gas.[48]

The offshore potential however has been a much nicer picture. China has at least three significant gas fields, one oil, and two gas, within domestic waters. The Bohai Bay project produces oil out of the Yellow Sea, Zhujiang Mouth and Beiby Bay fields are charged with gas. The three plays will soon all be in production and ease some pressure on supply. [49]

Although the current government does not trumpet environmental concerns as a priority, it is well aware that the need to clean up the air is a clear and present issue. A national standard has been formulated to make a switch to gas from dirty fossil fuels such as coal. The Beijing Municipal Plan gives top priority to the switch seeing as how it is an international city that comes under the scrutiny of the cosmopolitan community.[50] However, with American Department of Energy projected growth rates for China at 150 and 1129 percent for oil and gas respectively, it will be very difficult to finds the needed resources to cover those projections in a region where other actors are vying for the same scarce resources from the same sources, limited in quantity.[51]



Conflict Potential

As we have discussed above, both China and Japan are entering periods were competing resource claims for sources of energy essential to domestic functioning will become evermore import and could yield possible violent outbreaks if they haven’t already. In addition there is the historical factor of lingering World War 2 matters which do not help the situation as some parties are still sour about certain events and their outcome. Below we will look at three dominating scenes. The first is the tension which has been ongoing for several years in the South China Sea, secondly we will address the issue of the East China Sea and lastly we will look at latest developments at the Russian owned Sakhalin Island play.

The South China Sea

As previously stated, China has been forced to look for sources of crude in offshore locations given the economic reasons. Therefore, in an effort to expand on their current drill sites which fall into their Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) as defined by the United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), China has undertaken some rather aggressive positions in the South China Sea.

The competing claims, between China; Vietnam; the Philippines; Taiwan and Malaysia, to the potential oil fields in and around the Spratly Islands, has been validate recently as China Ministry of Geology and Mineral Resources reported that the potential for 130 billion barrels of oil was present in the region.[52] Given that many states have overlapping EEZ’s over the designated territory, there is a good deal of jockeying and strong arming going on to secure the limited riches under the sea.

Since 1988, Chinese forces have begun seizing control of individual islands claimed by other nations, and establishing small military outpost.[53] China’s formally claimed sovereignty over for the Spratly chain in 1992 and has subsequently empowered the Peoples Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) to use force if required to defend the island against foreign claims or occupation and ensure that the drilling leases it has granted to private oil firms are honored.[54] Violent clashes and flexing of muscles have almost been a yearly event, if not multiple times a year, from 1988 to 1999 which included the infamous Mischief reef incident.[55]

The developments in the PLAN’s naval arms race to better lockdown the area have raised eyebrows in Japan. With a heavy dependence on Middle-Eastern sources of oil, foreign LPG and coal, the Straight of Malacca and the South China Sea are vital trade routes for the imported products.[56] In response to the heightened tension in this strategically important region, Japan has take the necessary steps under the National Defense Program Outline to make naval advancements in order to better defend its surrounding areas.[57] A violent outburst in the region would require that Japanese tankers detour the South China Sea which would greatly disrupt the supply chain of oil. There is obviously an interest for Tokyo to ensure that there is peace and stability in these waters as the economic ramifications of an unintentional blockade would be devastating to the Japanese economy, delaying vital shipments by several days.[58]

The East China Sea

The potential conflict in the East China Sea is similar to the potential one in the South China Sea as they both stem from competing claims over EEZ’s which contain oil and gas reserves which could be very interesting. The states involved in this area are Japan, China and Taiwan who are all claiming sovereignty over islets of the name Senkaku.

China has taken the initiative to begin drilling in locations that are contested by Japan, but that it believes it has rights over. Bolstering their presence at the offshore platforms, the PLAN has had a continuing presence near the resources and had a few close calls with Japanese forces in the last few years. In 2005, Chinese ships made hostile advances on Japanese recon jets which demonstrate the potential severity of the situation. As one Japanese official said: “The Chinese side have used military power to leverage their political situation. The squadron was an attack squadron and its purpose was quite clear­to strengthen against the Japanese position. This is a really unfortunate development, for it could lead to the kind of vicious cycle that descends into military conflict.” [59] Moreover, in a previous event, a Chinese submarine was caught cruising through Japanese waters. Failing to surface and identify itself, as is the convention in times of peace, the Japanes Self-Defence Forces went on alert. Viewed simply as an act of “flexing the muscle,” it demonstrates that there is a real possibility for friction.[60]

Japan has not been totally innocent in the situation either, as it has granted domestic firms drilling rights to the region as well as conducting oceanographic data collection for potential reservoirs while totally disregard for others EEZ claims which China has called Tokyo out on. However, as not to create to much of an upheaval, Japan claims not to want to get involved in a tit-for-tat situation in which escalation of violence is a natural route. Instead, Tokyo would like to see more cooperation with Beijing on the matter of resources given that they are large trading partners and have competing claims that will no soon be settled. Positive developments have occurred in recent times in the private sector where firms from each side have exchange contracts and are dealing with one and other. [61]

Sakhalin Island

Continuing with the theme of direct competition for the same source, there is the issue of the Russian Sakhalin-2 oil and gas play. Initially development for the second phase of mega-project was contracted out via Production Sharing Agreements (PSA) in 1994 to a consortium of foreign firms. The break down is currently of 55 percent of the project belonging to Royal-Dutch Shell, Mitsui and Mitsubishi own 25 and 20 per cent respectively.[62] In the recent months however, as the cost for development has risen dramatically, the Kremlin has initiated an asset transfer, via its state owned gas giant Gazprom, thereby essentially stripping Japanese interests of their future resources.[63]

As the world’s premier gas importer with visions of expanding the industry, Japan must fight every step of the way with China to get a slice of the pie which China continuously wants more of. At the Sakhalin-1 project, Tokyo got the shaft yet again. Despite owning 30 percent of the play via the Sakhalin Oil and Gas Development Company, Exxon who owns the majority has the final say in whom to sell the extracted product to, and has chosen to sell the gas to Beijing instead of Tokyo. Moreover, there are high level talks with Gazprom in regards to setting up a pipeline from the Sakhalin Island to China for direct local distribution.[64] Additionally, the third phase of exploration on the island is being undertaken by state owned Sinopec and Rosneft which will benefit Chinese metropolitans.[65]

In the case of the Sakhalin projects, it is quite obvious that Tokyo is constantly getting the short end of the stick as Beijing is getting favored at every corner. Given that the events are occurring on a third party’s sovereign territory and that PSA’s are governed by international law, it is unlikely that a violent outburst would arise. That is not to say that stirrings will not arise on a diplomatic level as Japan scrambles to hang on to what it had previously secured, whereas everyone seems to want to sell to the Chinese at the drop of a dime.


Conclusion

At the end of the day, energy is a vital part of the entire process by which society works. As such, it is not much of a surprise that the large issue has many dimensions and factors which must be taken into account in order to comprehend each states goal and means to achieve them.

In the case of Japan, their energy policy is dictated by the “3E’s” and severely restricted by the upstream supply of resources. As such Tokyo is taking all the necessary steps to ensure that their supplies remain more or less steady for fear of violent economic repercussions in the event of disruption. Highly dependant on foreign sources for oil and gas, Japan must succeed in keeping the peace in the region to ensure the safe passage of its supplies as well as the potential exploration of resources in nearby waters. Alas, roadblocks are hit at every possible opportunity, and confrontation with China is almost always an issue.

In the case of China, the biggest challenge is to produce enough electricity for the exponential growth the state is experiencing. Securing supplies oil and gas is by far the most immediate concern, but there have been several positive developments in recent years with the growth of foreign source selling to China. Domestically, if Beijing is not careful, they will soon run into the same dilemma with coal as they have with crude – turning from a net exporter into a net importer. As coal is the basis for reliable electrical generation on the mainland, it is essential that supply remain constant.

Looking forward, it would not be unfathomable to see aggression between these two Asian powers escalate. There is a history of bad blood, a strong competition for the same commodities and deep economic ties between them. I would suggest that tension would mount in legal matters prior to full blown military action due to the fact that regional peace would be most beneficial to all actors as well as the international community which would be engaged as well due to treaty obligations.



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[1] Naval-History.net. (2000). India and the Pacific Oceans at the Start of 1941.
[2] Energy Policies of IEA Countries, Japan 1999 Review p.21
[3] Energy Policies of IEA Countries, Japan 1999 Review p.24
[4] Energy Policies of IEA Countries, Japan 1999 Review p.24
[5] Ministry of Trade Economy and Industry. (2001). Energy in Japan.
[6] Ministry of Trade Economy and Industry. (2001). Energy in Japan.
[7] Energy Policies of IEA Countries, Japan 1999 Review p.103
[8] Zee News. (2006). Kuwait says oil prices stable on OPEC cut plan.
[9] The Jamestown Foundation. (2006). Nigerian Security Forces Clash with Niger Delta Militants
[10] Energy Policies of IEA Countries, Japan 1999 Review p.73
[11] Sprott Asset Management. (2006). Piquing Over the Peak.
[12] Energy Policies of IEA Countries, Japan 1999 Review p.104
[13] Energy Policies of IEA Countries, Japan 1999 Review p.110
[14] Energy Policies of IEA Countries, Japan 1999 Review p.124
[15] Energy Policies of IEA Countries, Japan 1999 Review p.111
[16] Energy Policies of IEA Countries, Japan 1999 Review p.118
[17] Energy Policies of IEA Countries, Japan 1999 Review p.69
[18] Energy Policies of IEA Countries, Japan 1999 Review p.119
[19] Energy Policies of IEA Countries, Japan 1999 Review p.119
[20] Energy Policies of IEA Countries, Japan 1999 Review p.129
[21] Ministry of Trade Economy and Industry. (2004). Japan’s New Coal Policy Towards 2030.
[22] Energy Policies of IEA Countries, Japan 1999 Review p.69
[23] Energy Policies of IEA Countries, Japan 1999 Review p.24
[24] Energy Policies of IEA Countries, Japan 1999 Review p.111
[25] Agency for Natural Resources and Energy. (2002). Examination of Policies Concerning Natural Gas.
[26] http://www.enecho.meti.go.jp/english/energy/lng/examination.html
[27] Energy Policies of IEA Countries, Japan 1999 Review p.112
[28] Energy Policies of IEA Countries, Japan 1999 Review p.115
[29] Energy Policies of IEA Countries, Japan 1999 Review p.69
[30] Energy Policies of IEA Countries, Japan 1999 Review p.24
[31] Energy Policies of IEA Countries, Japan 1999 Review p.55
[32] Government of Japan. (2004). Convention on Nuclear Safety - National Report of Japan for the Third Meeting.. p.8-5
[33] Government of Japan. (2004). Convention on Nuclear Safety - National Report of Japan for the Third Meeting. p.6-3
[34] Government of Japan. (2004). Convention on Nuclear Safety - National Report of Japan for the Third Meeting. p.9-1
[35] Government of Japan. (2004). Convention on Nuclear Safety - National Report of Japan for the Third Meeting. p.10-1
[36] International Monetary Fund. (1997). Why is China Growing so Fast?
[37] International Energy Agency. (2000). China’s Worldwide Quest for Energy Security. p.15
[38] International Energy Agency. (2000). China’s Worldwide Quest for Energy Security. p.17
[39] International Energy Agency. (2000). China’s Worldwide Quest for Energy Security. p.62
[40] International Energy Agency. (2000). China’s Worldwide Quest for Energy Security. p.28
[41] International Energy Agency. (2000). China’s Worldwide Quest for Energy Security. p.28
[42] Watts, Susan. (March 9, 2005). A Coal Dependant Future?
[43] International Energy Agency. (2000). China’s Worldwide Quest for Energy Security. p.18
[44] International Energy Agency. (2000). China’s Worldwide Quest for Energy Security. p.21
[45] People’s Daily Online. (2005). Coal shortage in China to hit 330 million tons by 2010.
[46] Central Intelligence Agency- The Factbook. (2006). China.
[47] International Energy Agency. (2000). China’s Worldwide Quest for Energy Security. p.22
[48] International Energy Agency. (2000). China’s Worldwide Quest for Energy Security. p.24
[49] International Energy Agency. (2000). China’s Worldwide Quest for Energy Security. p.24
[50] International Energy Agency. (2000). China’s Worldwide Quest for Energy Security. p.27
[51] Klare, p.115
[52] Klare, p119
[53] Klare, p.123
[54] Klare, p.121
[55] Klare, p.124
[56] Klare, p.117
[57] Klare, p.131
[58] Klare, p.114
[59] Economist.com (2006). Oil and gas in troubled waters.
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